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THE FIRST AMENDMENT & CURRENT STATE-LEVEL
LEGISLATIVE REPRESSION
John Lorangerd1
INTRODUCTION
Widespread organized and violent public dissent triumphed over
authoritarian suppression in the founding struggle of the United States. In a
prompt act of historical irony, criticism of the state was quickly outlawed in
the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798. Despite expiring in 1801, the Alien
and Sedition Acts introduced a repressive approach to dissent that has
persisted throughout U.S. history.1 Judges took over a century to read
meaningful protections into the First Amendment.2 Today, there is a right to
dissent established in First Amendment doctrine that includes the right to
assemble, to engage in protected speech and conduct, and to publish without
fear of prior restraint or government reprisal. However, a new wave of
repression will test the viability of modern legal standards in an era where
the other branches of government are again displaying great hostility
d1

John Loranger is a member of the Class of 2018 at CUNY School of Law. He will
be joining Brooklyn Defender Services as a staff attorney in the Family Defense Practice in
September 2018. The author would like to thank the entire Footnote Forum section of the
CUNY Law Review, as well as JP Perry, Mackenzie Lew, Susa Maltz, and Professor
Ruthann Robson. A special thanks to Princess Masilungan for bringing this note to fruition
and her invaluable assistance and collaboration in the process.
1
The extensive political repression carried out by federal and state executive agencies
at various points throughout United States history against dissenters should be
acknowledged as closely interwoven with the work of the legislative branch. This paper
focuses on present-day, state level legislative enabling of repression and potential future
responses by the judiciary. For a detailed presentation of an integrated history, see
generally STEPHEN M. FELDMAN, FREE EXPRESSION AND DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA: A
HISTORY (2008).
2
See ANTHONY LEWIS, FREEDOM FOR THE THOUGHT WE HATE: A BIOGRAPHY OF THE
FIRST AMENDMENT xiii (2007).
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towards free speech rights and many who practice them.
The legal mechanism of repression, the national security state, has
grown exponentially in size and power since September 11, 2001, signaling
a devaluation of First Amendment protections in favor of notions of
security.3 The Patriot Act and dramatic growth of state surveillance, lawful
and not, have combined with a more permissive social attitude towards
concentrated power in state security agencies, creating the most adverse
conditions for dissenters in decades.4 Legislation proposed with a public
target identified by its authors is deemed content-neutral, and federal courts
uphold regulations on demonstration zones they admit resemble
“internment camp[s]” and are “offense[s] to the spirit of the First
Amendment,” as reasonable time, place, or manner restrictions.5 Police
departments are armed to the hilt with billions of dollars in military grade
equipment.6
Despite these conditions, a growing number of social movements are
thriving in the face of serious repression. There were over 600 arrests of
people resisting the Dakota Access Pipeline in North Dakota alone,
including felony charges for civil disobedience such as locking down to
construction equipment.7 At the presidential inauguration in 2017, over 200
people were arrested and were charged with felonies.8 A superseding
indictment including new felony charges now places hundreds of people at
risk of spending decades in prison.9 The Federal Bureau of Investigation’s
3

MICHAEL RATNER & MARGARET RATNER KUNSTLER, HELL NO: YOUR RIGHT TO
DISSENT IN TWENTY-FIRST-CENTURY AMERICA 26-39 (2011).
4
See id. at 16-39, for an outline of the conditions of dissent in the United States after
September 11, 2001.
5
See Coal. to Protest Democratic Nat’l Convention v. City of Boston, 327 F. Supp. 2d
61, 74, 76 (D. Mass. 2004).
6
See Matt Apuzzo, War Gear Flows to Police Departments, N.Y. TIMES (June 8,
2014), https://perma.cc/N2ZA-2RDW (“During the Obama administration, according to
Pentagon data, police departments have received tens of thousands of machine guns; nearly
200,000 ammunition magazines; thousands of pieces of camouflage and night-vision
equipment; and hundreds of silencers, armored cars and aircraft.”); see also Christopher
Ingraham, The Pentagon Gave Nearly Half a Billion Dollars of Military Gear to Local Law
Enforcement Last Year, WASH. POST: WONKBLOG (Aug. 14, 2014),
https://perma.cc/DLZ9-MHWF (“The 1033 program has transferred more than $4.3 billion
in equipment since its inception in 1997.”).
7
See Colin Moynihan, A Murky Legal Mess at Standing Rock, NEW YORKER (Jan. 11,
2017), https://perma.cc/38RN-E8VS; Max Grossfeld, Protester Arrested After Handcuffing
Himself to Backhoe to Halt Dakota Access Pipeline Construction, WEST DAKOTA FOX
(Aug. 31, 2016, 10:14 AM), https://perma.cc/QVX7-Z5MN.
8
Natasha Lennard, How the Government is Turning Protestors into Felons, ESQUIRE
(Apr. 12, 2017), https://perma.cc/6UJU-RS2U.
9
Patrick Strickland, ACLU Sues D.C. Police Over Violence at Anti-Trump Rally, AL
JAZEERA (June 26, 2017), https://perma.cc/SJ4J-68FM (“Most of the charges against the
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(“F.B.I.”) Joint Terrorism Task Forces, involving an array of federal, state,
and local agencies, have turned their attention to social justice movements
such as Occupy Wall Street, Black Lives Matter, and #NODAPL.10 Police
departments across the country have been caught spying on Black Lives
Matter organizers, often using sophisticated technology such as Sting-Rays
to monitor the communications of demonstrators.11 Like the years of
COINTELPRO, use of informants and undercover infiltrators is
widespread, although revelations of infiltration have centered on local
agencies.12 Law enforcement and military contractors are partnering to
suppress domestic movements.13 The ascendancy of authoritarian and white
nationalist narratives, such as the “paid protester” and “war on police”
tropes,14 have emboldened lawmakers to target dissent.
In this context, legislators in at least twenty-two states across the
country are continuing the longstanding U.S. tradition of responding to
dissent with repression, proposing a climbing total of over fifty repressive
bills since 2016.15 These bills range from relieving motorists who strike
protesters in the roadway of liability to seizing the assets of anyone police
can arrest at a protest deemed unlawful.16 Over a dozen bills have been
withdrawn or failed after strong public opposition, underscoring the legal
reality: the best opportunity to defeat repressive legislation is often prior to
its passage.
defendants carry maximum sentences that range between 70 and 80 years in prison.”).
10
George Joseph, Exclusive: Feds Regularly Monitored Black Lives Matter Since
Ferguson, INTERCEPT (July 24, 2015, 2:50 PM), https://perma.cc/KTE5-XWR7; Sam
Levin, Revealed: FBI Terrorism Taskforce Investigating Standing Rock Activists,
GUARDIAN (Feb. 10, 2017, 6:00 AM), https://perma.cc/KDX2-JP2R.
11
See, e.g., Elyssa Cherney, Chicago Lawyer Files Federal Lawsuit Over Police
Cellphone Tracking System, CHI. TRIBUNE (Jan. 13, 2017, 3:17 PM),
https://perma.cc/P7ZK-7F7P; Joseph, supra note 10; George Joseph, Undercover Police
Have Regularly Spied on Black Lives Matter Activists in New York, INTERCEPT (Aug. 18,
2015, 5:27 PM), https://perma.cc/QAM8-N9N2.
12
See, e.g., Chris Hawley, NYPD Monitored Muslim Students All Over Northeast,
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Feb. 18, 2012), https://perma.cc/QQA3-P3KD (discussing how the
NYPD infiltrated Muslim student groups far outside New York City, even recording how
many times a day students prayed).
13
Alleen Brown et al., Leaked Documents Reveal Counterterrorism Tactics Used at
Standing Rock to “Defeat Pipeline Insurgencies,” INTERCEPT (May 27, 2017, 8:04 AM),
https://perma.cc/TS8Y-6NKM.
14
See Allie Conti, Why the Ridiculous ‘Paid Protester’ Myth Refuses to Die, VICE
(Mar. 1, 2017, 7:12 AM), https://perma.cc/596U-4NYC; Dan Berger, Op-Ed, A Brief
History of the “War on Cops”: The False Allegation that Enables Police Violence,
TRUTHOUT (July 21, 2016), https://perma.cc/K9NG-HGFF.
15
See infra Appendix A.
16
Traci Yoder, New Anti-Protesting Legislation: A Deeper Look, NATIONAL LAWYERS
GUILD (Mar. 2, 2017, 12:32 PM), https://perma.cc/WD6Z-4ZNJ.
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This paper reviews and analyzes a sample of these proposed bills vis-àvis current First Amendment law. After a brief introduction to relevant law,
I will address the most novel and constitutionally suspect measures, which
impose major financial liability on demonstrators. Next, bills that create
new criminal offenses or increase penalties for extant offenses, which are
severe but less constitutionally suspect, will be examined. Then, I will
briefly discuss driver liability bills, which have mainly been defeated by
public outcry and are legally problematic, before closing with a discussion
of recent anti-masking legislation and its historical context. I argue that this
legislation is ripe for challenge.
Overall, while First Amendment frameworks exist to mount a strong
challenge to many of the most authoritarian of the proposed measures,
critical doctrinal safeguards have been eroded. Two major areas of concern
are the content-based inquiry and the narrow tailoring requirement of
incidental burdens on protected speech and time, place, or manner
restrictions. In a broader social and political context where growing dissent
is countered by official claims that it is disloyal and specious, history
illustrates that the First Amendment cannot be relied on as a bulwark to
blunt repression in a systematic or effective way.
BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL ANALYSIS
The First Amendment was incorporated through the Fourteenth
Amendment and made applicable to the states in 1925.17 Ideally, people are
protected by the First Amendment even when their speech makes them
unpopular with leaders of the state or a majority of the public: “The
Fourteenth Amendment does not permit a State to make criminal the
peaceful expression of unpopular views.”18 This can be true even when
speech provokes a condition of unrest. In Terminiello v. City of Chicago,
the Supreme Court wrote:
The vitality of civil and political institutions
in our society depends on free discussion. . . .
The right to speak freely and to promote
diversity of ideas and programs is therefore
one of the chief distinctions that sets us apart
from totalitarian regimes.

17

Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 237 (1963) (overturning convictions of
Black citizens demonstrating against discrimination for breach of the peace after they
refused to disperse from Capitol grounds and instead sat and sang songs).
18
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Accordingly a function of free speech under
our system of government is to invite dispute.
It may indeed best serve its high purpose
when it induces a condition of unrest, creates
dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or
even stirs people to anger. Speech is often
provocative and challenging. It may strike at
prejudices and preconceptions and have
profound unsettling effects as it presses for
acceptance of an idea. That is why freedom of
speech, though not absolute, is nevertheless
protected against censorship or punishment,
unless shown likely to produce a clear and
present danger of a serious substantive evil
that rises far above public inconvenience,
annoyance, or unrest. There is no room under
our Constitution for a more restrictive view.
For the alternative would lead to
standardization of ideas either by legislatures,
courts, or dominant political or community
groups.19
As a corollary, the government must be prevented from inhibiting speech
merely because it finds doing so convenient: “the prime objective of the
First Amendment is not efficiency.”20
Another pillar of First Amendment doctrine is the prohibition on
government regulation of expression due to its message, ideas, or subject
matter, known as the requirement of content-neutrality.21 Statutes that are
not content-neutral are presumptively unconstitutional and subject to strict
scrutiny; they therefore “must be the least restrictive means of achieving a
compelling state interest.”22 Facially content-based laws are immediately
subject to strict scrutiny, and a facially neutral law will be adjudicated as
content-based and subject to strict scrutiny if it cannot be justified absent
reference to the content of the regulated speech, or is enacted due to
disagreement with the content of speech subject to regulation.23 If a facially
19

Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1949) (citations omitted).
McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2540 (2014).
21
See id. at 2529-30.
22
Id. at 2530 (citation omitted).
23
Reed v. Town of Gilbert, Ariz., 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2227 (2015) (quoting Ward v. Rock
Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791-92 (1989)). Here, a majority of the Court backed a
more rigorous inquiry into the question of facial neutrality, finding Gilbert’s sign code
made facial distinctions and failed strict scrutiny for its underinclusion. Id. In overturning
20
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neutral law is demonstrated to favor or facilitate a certain speaker while
stopping others when it is applied, this is impermissible viewpoint
discrimination, an “egregious form of content discrimination.”24
Far from all speech is protected. Fighting words, true threats, fraud,
defamation, and obscenity are all categorically excluded from the First
Amendment’s umbrella.25 Even if expressive conduct falls outside one of
these categories, it may not be considered speech within the ambit of
protection. The test is whether the speaker engaged in the expressive
conduct with the “intent to convey a particularized message . . . and in the
surrounding circumstances the likelihood was great that the message would
be understood by those who viewed it.”26
Furthermore, “incidental limitations” on protected expression are
justified when expressive and non-expressive actions are combined in a
single course of conduct and the government has a “substantial or
important” interest at stake.27 In such cases, assuming the underlying power
to regulate, the action is constitutional when “the governmental interest is
unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental
restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is
essential to the furtherance of that interest.”28 In the case that established
this doctrine, United States v. O’Brien, the preservation of draft cards to
ensure their “continued availability” for the smooth functioning of the
Selective Service system was facially unrelated to expressive conduct and
served “a legitimate and substantial purpose in the system’s
administration."29 Finally, the Court could “perceive no alternative means
that would more precisely and narrowly assure the continuing availability of
issued Selective Service certificates than a law which prohibits their willful

the Ninth Circuit decision that found the code facially content-neutral and constitutional,
Reed signals the possibility of a less bleak path for challenges to arguably facially
discriminatory statutes. See id. at 2227-31.
24
Coakley, 134 S. Ct. at 2532-33 (quoting Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ.
of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995)).
25
United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 468-69 (2010) (internal citations omitted).
26
Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410-11 (1974) (overturning as a violation of
right to free speech student’s conviction for hanging an American flag with an upsidedown peace symbol attached outside of window of apartment in wake of the killing of
students at Kent State University by the National Guard and the U.S. invasion of
Cambodia).
27
See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968) (“This Court has held that
when ‘speech’ and ‘nonspeech’ elements are combined in the same course of conduct, a
sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech element can
justify incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms.”).
28
Id. at 377.
29
Id. at 377-78.
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mutilation or destruction.”30
As technological capacity and resources for state security forces to
suppress dissent increased dramatically in the twentieth century, the
Supreme Court declared those who wish to express their views in public are
worthy of receiving the height of constitutional protection.31 The Court
reasoned that traditional sites of public dialogue, known as public forums,
occupy a “special position in terms of First Amendment protection.”32
These spaces, such as streets and parks, “have immemorially been held in
trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for
purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and
discussing public questions.”33 Due to their central importance in the free
exchange of ideas the First Amendment protects, in these places, “the
government's ability to permissibly restrict expressive conduct is very
limited.”34
Despite lofty rhetoric, extensive and severe regulations on speech
activity in streets and other public fora may be upheld as legitimate time,
place, or manner restrictions, for example under the doctrine governing
competing uses of public space.35 These regulations are constitutional if
they “are justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech, .
. . they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest,”
and the regulation leaves “open ample alternative channels for
communication of the information.”36 To satisfy the narrow tailoring
requirement, the regulation cannot “burden substantially more speech than
is necessary to further the government’s legitimate interests,” which could
range from ensuring public safety and order, promoting the free flow of
traffic on streets and sidewalks, protecting property rights, to protecting
women’s freedom to access pregnancy related services.37 If there are
alternative measures that “burden substantially less speech,” the
government must show those alternative measures “would fail to achieve
the government’s interests, not simply that the chosen route is easier.”38
30

Id. at 381.
See Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931) (“The maintenance of the
opportunity for free political discussion to the end that government may be responsive to
the will of the people and that changes may be obtained by lawful means, an opportunity
essential to the security of the Republic, is a fundamental principle of our constitutional
system.”).
32
United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 180 (1983).
33
Hague v. Comm. For Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939).
34
Grace, 461 U.S. at 177.
35
See Bl(a)ck Tea Soc’y v. City of Boston, 378 F.3d 8, 19 (1st Cir. 2004) (Lipez, J.,
concurring).
36
Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (citations omitted).
37
McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2535 (2014).
38
Id. at 2540.
31
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PROTESTER LIABILITY & ASSET SEIZURE STATUTES
Relatively few bills regarding protester liability and civil asset seizure
exist, but the proposals are draconian. While many have been defeated, in
August 2017, Pennsylvania Republicans proposed a bill making protesters
liable for police overtime, medical and emergency response, and other
“public safety response costs” if they are convicted of a felony or
misdemeanor stemming from the demonstration.39 Across the country in
Arizona, S.B. 1142, which was propelled through the State Senate in the
2016-2017 legislative year by Republicans who claimed that people are
paid to riot, would have made riot a racketeering offense.40 This would have
allowed police to arrest organizers prior to a protest, or to subject them to
liability for damages caused by others.41 The bill was publicly shelved by
Arizona’s Speaker of the House after mass outcry.42 In North Carolina, H.B.
249, entitled “Economic Terrorism,” proposes sweeping changes to the
criminal code.43 Among them is liability for all “public safety response
costs” incurred for anyone convicted of obstructing traffic or participation
in an unlawful assembly.44 Similarly, Washington State Senator Doug
Ericksen introduced S.B. 5009, a sweeping bill enhancing penalties for
crimes involving “economic disruption.”45 Ericksen first promised a
measure to fight “economic terrorism,” but retreated from this language
after condemnation by the local media, civil society, and advocates.46 The
bill essentially creates a new offense of “economic disruption,” which
operates as a mandatory sentencing enhancement if the prosecution alleges,
and the judge finds, by a preponderance of the evidence the underlying
offense was committed to cause an economic disruption.47 Restitution may
be ordered up to “double the amount of the defendant’s gain or victim’s

39

S.B. 754, 2017 Gen. Assemb., Reg Sess. (Pa. 2017); see also Zaid Jilani, New Bill
Would Force Arrested Protesters to Pay Police Overtime, Other Fees, INTERCEPT (Aug.
23, 2017, 4:12 PM), https://perma.cc/RTH8-HXCU.
40
S.B. 1142, 53rd Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2017).
41
See Ray Stern, Plan a Protest, Lose Your House: Arizona Senate Passes SB 1142
Charging ‘Provocateurs’ With Racketeering, PHOENIX NEW TIMES (Feb. 23, 2017, 11:06
AM), https://perma.cc/EBQ5-UTRE (discussing implications of S.B. 1142, a bill written by
a former police officer and motivated by the idea of the paid protestor).
42
See id.
43
H.B. 249, 2017 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2017).
44
Id.
45
S.B. 5009, 65th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2017).
46
Jim Brunner, Trump Supporter in State Senate Says Some Protests Are ‘Economic
Terrorism,’ Should Be Felonies, SEATTLE TIMES (Nov. 16, 2016, 8:33 PM),
https://perma.cc/LA2Y-M28R.
47
S.B. 5009, 65th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2017).
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loss.”48 Senator Ericksen stated that the main targets of his bill are members
of the climate movement, specifically those who block oil trains.49
On May 15, 2017, Oklahoma’s governor signed H.B. 2128.50 The law is
aimed at people accused of trespass and anyone who “compensates . . . or
remunerates” trespassers, a testament to the potency of the paid protester
trope.51 People arrested or convicted of trespassing are now liable for any
“damages to personal or real property while trespassing.”52
Minnesota’s legislature is considering measures that could,
theoretically, quickly push even well-heeled demonstrators into bankruptcy:
H.F. 322 and corresponding S.F. 679. The bills would make any person
convicted of participating in, or being present at, an “unlawful assembly,”
or of committing a “public nuisance” civilly liable for “public safety
response costs.”53 The text does not delineate any share or apportionment of
costs, implying each person could be held liable for the entire sum.54 Public
safety response costs generally run into the tens of thousands, if not
hundreds of thousands of dollars. The Bloomington police, for instance—a
single agency of several that responded—logged $25,000 in personnel and
overtime costs alone responding to a December 2014 Black Lives Matter
protest at the Mall of America.55 The bill’s author, former law enforcement
official and sponsor of other legislation targeting protest, Nick Zerwas,
explained that his constituents’ feelings motivated him to introduce H.F.
322: “I have an entire constituency that feels as though protesters believe
that their rights are more important than everyone else’s. . . . Well, there is a
cost to that. Rosa Parks sat in the front of the bus. She didn’t get out and lay
down in front of the bus.”56 Misrepresenting the nature of the Civil Rights
48

Id.
Essex Porter, Protest Bill Creates Crime of ‘Economic Terrorism’, KIRO 7 (Nov. 18,
2016, 9:41 AM), https://perma.cc/G8EY-4ER9.
50
See H.B. 2128, 56th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2017).
51
Id.
52
Id.
53
H.F. 322, 90th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2017); S.F. 679, 90th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn.
2017).
54
S.F. 679, 90th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2017); see also H.F. 322, 90th Leg., Reg.
Sess. (Minn. 2017).
55
State Representative Nick Zerwas, Press Release: Rep. Zerwas Introduces
Legislation Relating to Unlawful Assembly, MINN. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (Mar. 10,
2016), https://perma.cc/3QVE-RTG7; see also Associated Press, Chanting ‘Black Lives
Matter,’ Protesters Shut Down Part of Mall of America, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 20, 2014),
https://perma.cc/KUH4-A4FR. Representative Zerwas is the son of a long-serving
Minnesota police chief and worked as a print examiner in a forensics crime lab prior to
being elected. See About Nick Zerwas, ZERWASFORHOUSE.COM, https://perma.cc/Q248Y6TT (last visited Nov. 18, 2017).
56
Jared Goyette, Minnesota Bill Would Make Convicted Protestors Liable for Policing
Costs, GUARDIAN (Jan. 25, 2017, 8:54 AM), https://perma.cc/EX2Y-5T2S (quoting
49

28

CUNY LAW REVIEW FOOTNOTE FORUM

[Vol. 21:1

Movement, while nodding to the legitimacy of protest, Zerwas weaponized
history in his attempt to justify severe penalties for modern civil and human
rights activists.
Regardless of any difference in liability imposed among the bills, one
avenue for immediately challenging any of these bills is that they are
unconstitutionally overbroad, inevitably ramming headlong into not only
lawful but especially protected First Amendment activity. The U.S.
Supreme Court has recognized that a law may be facially invalid against the
First Amendment if “a substantial number of its applications are
unconstitutional, judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate
sweep.”57 There is a “plain requirement for laws and regulations to be
drawn so as to give citizens fair warning as to what is illegal; for regulation
of conduct that involves freedom of speech and assembly not to be so broad
in scope as to stifle First Amendment freedoms, which ‘need breathing
space to survive.’”58
There are arguments against Oklahoma’s bill on these grounds if it can
be effectively demonstrated a far larger amount of protected activity is
punished than what is legitimately targeted. Liability is not moored to
proven illegal conduct, but only an accusation in the form of an arrest;
under the new law, people may be sued for damages from a crime the
criminal court finds they did not commit. More people are arrested for
trespass than are convicted.
Furthermore, people who have never set foot on the property in question
could be lawfully sued for damages if they have “compensated or
remunerated” people who did cause the damage for trespassing or people
the state accuses, but never proves, caused the damage (people arrested but
never convicted).59 Many environmental organizations and unaffiliated
groups of activists set up online fundraising pages to fund their campaigns,
which often include notice of the group’s intent to engage in civil
disobedience such as trespassing on company easements to lock down to
construction equipment. Thousands of people donate to these pages; if a
donor’s money is distributed to individuals arrested for trespassing on a
natural gas pipeline construction site in Oklahoma, and damage is caused, it
seems that under this scheme, a donor who has “compensated or
remunerated” the arrestee for the trespass could be amenable to a civil suit;
thus, a person in Alaska could be sued by an oil company in Oklahoma for
Representative Nick Zerwas).
57
United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 473 (2010) (quoting Wash. State Grange v.
Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 449 n.6 (2008)).
58
Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 574 (1965) (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S.
415, 433 (1963)).
59
See H.B. 2128, 56th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2017).

2018]

FIRST AMENDMENT & LEGISLATIVE REPRESSION

29

giving money online for “legal support” to an environmental activist
through a third party, who declared their intent to use civil disobedience to
fight a pipeline, without any further knowledge about the campaign or the
activist’s specific plans. A reasonable person would not be aware of such
liability. This “compensation” provision is almost certainly an
unconstitutionally overbroad restriction on the rights to free speech and
association given the vast amount of lawful conduct it opens to liability.
Despite the Oklahoma law’s end run around the proof required for the
“beyond a reasonable doubt” standard, its individual liability section is
likely to withstand facial challenge on overbreadth grounds as, on its face,
civil liability for individual trespassers has little to no impact on protected
speech. The legislature seems to do be doing little more than codifying the
common law tort of trespass. However, it is worth noting that under current
law, property owners may be compensated for damages by trespassers
through criminal court-ordered restitution as part of a plea or sentencing,
and under this law, individuals who were wrongfully arrested could find
themselves defending against civil suits merely because they were easily
identifiable to a property owner.
In Minnesota, H.F. 322, if passed, should be found unconstitutional as a
content-based statute that fails strict scrutiny as underinclusive. While
facially neutral, its main sponsor justifies the bill with reference to certain
content of speech that will be burdened outside the four corners of the
document. Examining the “subjective” motives behind H.F. 322,—like the
sponsor’s stated intent—leads to a more accurate, honest assessment of
content-neutrality than an “objective” one focused on the literal phrasing of
the statute or the legislative history. This is especially true when motive is
used as a threshold issue in determining how to examine the government’s
proffered justifications.60 Besides his quip about Rosa Parks, Zerwas has
made multiple comments demonstrating that he is targeting the Black Lives
Matter movement and advocates for police accountability, despite
averments of neutrality.61 If the content-based distinction was a meaningful
safeguard, H.F. 322 would need to survive strict scrutiny—a nearly
impossible task given “it must be the least restrictive means of achieving a
60

See Fred C. Zacharias, Flowcharting the First Amendment, 72 CORNELL L. REV.
936, 967-81 (1987) (arguing for a balancing model for questions of free speech where a
holistic, subjective motive inquiry is a threshold question for determining burdens, by
asking whether improper motivations played a substantial part in the government’s
decision to regulate).
61
See, e.g., State Representative Nick Zerwas, supra note 55 (referencing three Black
Lives Matter-affiliated protests as the impetus for the bill); Tim Nelson, Activists, DFLers
Push Back Against Bill to Hold Protestors Liable for Costs, MPRNEWS.ORG (Jan. 24, 2017,
10:20 AM), https://perma.cc/F352-WVYB (“Zerwas cited protests at the Mall of America,
the Minneapolis-St. Paul International Airport and on interstates 35W and 94.”).
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compelling state interest.”62
Even accepting fiscal responsibility as a compelling interest, holding
individual protesters convicted of misdemeanors liable for massive sums of
aggregate costs far beyond what they can be reasonably responsible for is
not a narrowly tailored way of addressing said interest. There are many
other ways the municipality could choose to save money to help with public
safety response costs. Most directly and effectively, law enforcement could
stop responding to demonstrations with staggeringly expensive numbers of
police officers, especially where the demonstration includes civil
disobedience.63 Deploying police in such large numbers often leads to the
intensification of conflict, cycles of escalation, and the perceived need for
additional expenditure.64 H.F. 322 contributes directly to this problem
because it incentivizes police to declare protests to be unlawful assemblies
and subsequently arrest as many people as possible in the hopes of securing
convictions and, thus, imposing liability. In other words, the bill opens the
door to policing protests for profit, a potentiality ripe for abuse.65 This
incentivization is compounded by the reality that the police themselves are
presently the focus of sustained protected speech campaigns, including
those highly critical of police departments, the criminal justice system, and
elected officials. The bill thus represents a serious threat of chilling speech
because of the supposed benefits of repression to state apparatus in this
context.66 The bill is also glaringly underinclusive—practically all crimes
have public safety response costs associated, yet the bill singles out three,
all closely associated with protesting. Given this, the serious incidental
impacts and potential for abuse, and the less burdensome alternatives, the
means chosen do not narrowly fit the stated goal.
However, as a general matter, courts have found targeted laws to be
62

McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2530 (2014).
See, e.g., Rocco Parascandola & Barry Paddock, Police Protests Have Cost City
$22.9M Overtime for NYPD, Bill Bratton Says, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Dec. 16, 2014, 2:52
AM), https://perma.cc/V22P-QDS5; Thomas Dresslar, How Many Law Enforcement
Agencies Does It Take to Subdue a Peaceful Protest, ACLU (Nov. 30, 2016, 5:30 PM),
https://perma.cc/U6R6-4LD8.
64
See MIKE KING, WHEN RIOT COPS ARE NOT ENOUGH: THE POLICING AND
REPRESSION OF OCCUPY OAKLAND 23-46 (2017).
65
See, e.g., DICK M. CARPENTER II ET AL., INST. FOR JUSTICE, POLICING FOR PROFIT:
THE ABUSE OF CIVIL ASSET FORFEITURE 2-3 (2d ed. 2015), https://perma.cc/W254-FX2K
(documenting the explosive growth of civil asset forfeiture after Congress, in 1984, gave
agencies a financial stake in forfeiture by permitting revenue to flow back to individual
departments).
66
See Minneapolis NAACP condemns HF322, MINN. NAACP (Jan. 26, 2017),
https://perma.cc/7WAR-WYXL (pointing out that Minnesota is home to some of the
country’s most severe racial disparities and condemning H.F. 322 as an attempt to silence
those fighting to close that gap).
63
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content-neutral after cursory analysis.67 In doing so, they decline to engage
in any type of holistic inquiry into legislators’ motives, mainly because of
the difficulty of proof and judicial reticence to attribute constitutional
insufficiency to individual lawmakers.68
While “[t]he principal inquiry in determining content neutrality . . . is
whether the government has adopted a regulation of speech because of
disagreement with the message it conveys . . . [a] regulation that serves
purposes unrelated to the content of expression is deemed neutral, even if it
has an incidental effect on some speakers or messages but not others.”69
This can be true even where the motive of the bill’s main sponsor is
suppression based on content of speech: in evaluating whether the law is
justified without reference to content, the court can focus on the asserted
governmental purpose in the most general sense, not the justifications
provided by individuals that compose the government and who may have
written the law. The legislature is easily able to re-package an individual
lawmaker’s malicious or suppressive intent into a legitimate public policy
goal while the court turns its eye to the possibility of unconstitutionality.
For example, in O’Brien, the Court found that the governmental interest
was content-neutral and unrelated to the communicative aspect of O’Brien’s
act of burning his draft card, let alone to the suppression of free expression.
They derided the idea of motive analysis in the circumstances:
What motivates one legislator to make a
speech about a statute is not necessarily what
motivates scores of others to enact it, and the
stakes are sufficiently high for us to eschew
guesswork. We decline to void essentially on
the ground that it is unwise legislation which
Congress had the undoubted power to enact
and which could be reenacted in its exact
form if the same or another legislator made a
‘wiser’ speech about it.70
67

See, e.g., Barry P. McDonald, Speech and Distrust: Rethinking the Content
Approach to Protect Freedom of Expression, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1347, 1368-72
(2006); see also Leslie Gielow Jacobs, Clarifying the Content-based/Content-neutral and
Content/Viewpoint Determinations, 34 MCGEORGE L. REV. 595, 602-606 (2003).
68
See Zacharias, supra note 60, at 946 (noting that the application of motive analysis
has been inconsistent across contexts: in O’Brien, perhaps representing the context of street
protest, the Court has foresworn subjective motive analysis for the objective purpose
inquiry, but in the context of draft reclassifications cases such motive analysis was a
controlling factor, and in the whistleblower context it has played a limited but clear role).
69
Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989).
70
United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 384 (1968).
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The Court was not interested in including Congressional speeches about the
need to punish hippies and draft dodgers in its analysis in any substantive
manner.71
The court hearing a challenge to H.F. 322 could easily proceed in this
manner and find the legislation content-neutral. It would then likely analyze
it under O’Brien and its progeny as a government regulation that
incidentally burdens protected activity. The first issue would be whether the
law was unrelated to the suppression of speech based on its effect and
degree of impact.72 Minnesota would certainly argue that any incidental
burden on speech due to a vague chilling effect would be minor, and the
government’s interest in addressing the rising fiscal cost of protests is
substantial and legitimate, just like the smooth operation of the Selective
Service system in O’Brien. However, the potential chilling effect of such a
law is enormous given the lack of control a single individual has over
whether the police declare a protest a nuisance or unlawful assembly, and
also given the criminal and financial penalties for anyone convicted of a
minor misdemeanor stemming from such a declaration. However, similar
arguments have a mixed record of moving the needle to a finding of
purposeful suppression in this context.73 Ultimately, a court would balance
the deterrent effect of the law on protected activity with the weight of
government interests, and likely conclude the law is sufficiently unrelated to
suppression.74 The final hurdle would be finding the scheme appropriately
narrow, or whether “the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment
freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.”75
While the language of the test sounds promising for challengers to such an
underinclusive statute, in truth this would not be much of a hurdle at all
because this prong (and indeed the entire test) has devolved into a form of
much more lenient scrutiny, akin to rational basis review.76 On this track, it
is not a far stretch to conclude that H.F. 322, like the regulation prohibiting
the destruction of selective service cards, is one focused solely on the
71

See id. at 383 (“Inquiries into congressional motives or purposes are a hazardous
matter.”).
72
See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 911-15 (1982).
73
See Monica Youn, The Chilling Effect and the Problem of Private Action, 66 VAND.
L. REV. 1473, 1484-85 (2013).
74
See id. at 1494.
75
O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 377.
76
See David S. Day, The Incidental Regulation of Free Speech, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV.
491, 506-29 (1988), for a detailed discussion of this deterioration. See also Rumsfeld v.
Forum for Acad. And Inst. Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 67 (2006) (citation omitted) (“We
have held that ‘an incidental burden on speech is no greater than is essential, and therefore
is permissible under O’Brien, so long as the neutral regulation promotes a substantial
government interest that would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation.’”).
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noncommunicative, criminal aspect of a protester's conduct, and any
incidental burdens on speech are not greater than necessary to further the
government interests in both fiscal health and lawful behavior.77
In analyzing S.B. 5009 in Washington State, what should be noted first
are the mandatory, inalterable sentencing enhancements to be “served in
total confinement” for crimes attempted or committed with an intent to
cause “economic disruption.”78 The bill would amend state restitution law
to allow for up to “triple the amount of the offender’s gain or victim’s loss”
to be charged to any person who is “convicted of or pleads guilty to a
criminal offense in which there has been a special allegation that the person
committed the offense to cause an economic disruption.”79 According to the
bill, a person attempting to or causing an economic disruption intends to:
(a) Influence the policy of a government by
intimidation or coercion; and
(b) Obstruct, hinder, or delay the passage of
any train, truck, car, ship, boat, aircraft, or
other vehicle or vessel engaged in the
carriage, hauling, transport, shipment, or
delivery of goods, cargo, freight, or other
item, in commerce; or
(c) Interferes with, tampers with, damages, or
obstructs any pipeline facility, bulk oil
terminal, marine terminal, tank car,
waterborne vessel or barge, or power
plant.80
There is a strong argument that the law is unconstitutional under the
First Amendment as overbroad due to the sweeping breadth of the definition
of “economic disruption.” The bill’s backers certainly anticipate First
Amendment challenges and have inserted several disclaimers they hope will
assuage concerns courts may entertain. For example, the bill’s first section
states: “The legislature recognizes and fully supports the ability of
individuals to exercise their rights of free speech, press, and peaceful
assembly . . . . The legislature finds, however, that there is no right to harm
another person or prevent another person from exercising his or her
77

See Michael C. Dorf, Incidental Burdens on Fundamental Rights, 109 HARV. L.
REV. 1175, 1200-10 (1996) (discussing O’Brien’s incidental burden doctrine on the right to
speech and fundamental rights in general).
78
S.B. 5009, 65th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2017).
79
Id.
80
Id.
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rights.”81 Later, after setting out the sentencing enhancements provision, the
bill concludes that section with another disclaimer:
This offense does not include any activity that
is reasonably construed as persons engaged in
lawful activity including: Law enforcement
activity; construction; repair; maintenance;
utility work; a lawful strike or picketing;
peaceful protest; other authorized or properly
permitted conduct; or persons investigating or
reporting criminal conduct or illegal activity
to proper authorities.82
The state would certainly argue that these disclaimers defeat accusations of
overbreadth by narrowing the legitimate sweep of the statute. While
challengers on overbreadth grounds bear a heavy burden83 of showing
“substantial overbreadth,” even a prohibition on unprotected speech (or
conduct) cannot save a statute that prohibits or chills a substantial amount
of protected speech.84 In Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, the Court was
very clear: “The Government may not suppress lawful speech as the means
to suppress unlawful speech.”85
The main issue is whether the statute actually prohibits (here, punishes)
protected speech. The answer must unequivocally be yes, and a substantial
amount. First, it is practically impossible to imagine a scenario in which this
enhancement stems from an arrest made anywhere but some type of protest,
demonstration, or other politically motivated action. Second, Ericksen’s
own admission that the bill is inspired by climate justice activists confirms
the legislation is aimed at political speech and other First Amendment
protected activity.86
Consider the following common scenario: A demonstrator at a Black
Lives Matter demonstration in Seattle is charged with misdemeanor assault
81

Id.
Id.
83
Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 124 (2003) (dictum) (“Rarely, if ever, will an
overbreadth challenge succeed against a law or regulation that is not specifically addressed
to speech or to conduct necessarily associated with speech (such as picketing or
demonstrating).”).
84
“[T]he possible harm to society in permitting some unprotected speech to go
unpunished is outweighed by the possibility that protected speech of others may be muted
. . . .” Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 255 (2002) (quoting Broadrick v.
Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612 (1973)).
85
Id.
86
Porter, supra note 49.
82
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on a police officer, and the prosecutor alleges the crime was committed with
an intent to cause economic disruption because the demonstrator intended to
influence the policy of the federal government by intimidation or coercion.
This intent can be inferred from the defendant’s allegedly violent conduct at
a demonstration. First, even if the court declined to make such a finding, if
the defendant pleaded guilty to the assault, they would be liable for triple
restitution because they assaulted a police officer at a political
demonstration and not randomly on the street. This is the baseline fact
giving the prosecutor ammunition to make the allegation. Thus, the
enhancement illicitly punishes protected speech alongside unprotected
conduct.
In the second scenario, the demonstrator goes to trial to fight the charge.
She is in the profound bind of defending against the assault charge, while
also affirmatively proving to the judge that if the assault were committed, it
was not with the intent to cause an economic disruption. Perhaps the
defense is misidentification—the defendant simply did not do it. In this
case, the defendant must waive any opportunity to present evidence to the
judge regarding her intent because her argument against the main charge is
that she never had any. Alternatively, if the defendant acted in self-defense,
while she will have the opportunity to present evidence of a wholly
different intent to the judge, she runs the high risk of being perceived by the
jury in a highly negative light, undermining her ultimate chance of acquittal.
If the defendant is ultimately convicted, she will face the sentencing
enhancement and triple restitution upon a judicial finding of economic
disruption by a preponderance of the evidence. This result could be
reasoned as simply as: Because the defendant was present at a
demonstration with the goal of influencing government policy, and was
convicted of a crime reasonably construed as intimidating or coercive, the
crime was more likely than not committed with the intent to cause
economic disruption. In other words, the statute encourages the conflation
of an individual’s perceived motivation for engaging in protected political
activity with their intent while engaging in unlawful action. Thus, the
statute places a burden on these hypothetical defendants to prove their
speech is not unlawful, a constitutionally dubious situation.87 Such
conflation of this double mens rea requirement is even easier when the
offense is something like pedestrian interference or obstruction, two other
common protest related charges, and the theory is economic disruption
through the blocking of some vehicle of commerce.
Thus, without even addressing the chilling effect of the statute, the court
should find it void for overbreadth.
87

Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 255 (“The Government raises serious constitutional difficulties
by seeking to impose on the defendant the burden of proving his speech is not unlawful.”).
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Challengers could also argue that the law is facially content-based and
thus deserving of strict scrutiny because the sentencing enhancement for
crimes intended to cause economic disruption is predicated on the abstract
beliefs of the defendants—essentially any belief that would drive someone
to engage in public political action.88 The government would maintain that
the law is content-neutral, analogizing to Wisconsin v. Mitchell, and argue
the sentencing enhancement does not represent punishment of protected
beliefs, but rather “special harms distinct from their communicative
impact.”89 In Mitchell, a defendant faced a hate-crime sentencing
enhancement because he selected his victim on account of race. The Court,
noting that motive is a traditional and proper factor for sentencing judges to
consider, reasoned that the Wisconsin legislature’s desire to address special
harms perceived from the commission of bias-motivated crimes, such as
increased likelihood of criminal retaliation, the infliction of distinct
emotional harm, and the stirring of community unrest, provided “an
adequate explanation for its penalty-enhancement provision over and above
mere disagreement with offenders’ beliefs or biases.”90 Perhaps tellingly,
rather than focus on such special harms in the first section of the bill,
Ericksen solemnly swore S.B. 5009 does not target protected activity.91
Regardless, the government could argue that these special harms include
economic losses, incitement to community unrest, and others. Despite the
seeming absurdity of comparing the broader effects of crimes motivated by
bigotry against individuals to crimes committed while demonstrating or
protesting, the special harms could certainly be accepted.92 If the law is
found to be content-neutral, it will likely survive under incidental regulation
analysis, and if it is found to be content-based, it will very likely fail strict
scrutiny.
In conclusion, the bills creating some form of liability for protestors in
Oklahoma, Minnesota, and Washington, while rife with serious
constitutional issues, are by no means guaranteed to sink under the weight
of First Amendment challenges.

88

See Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 485 (1993) (“[A] defendant’s abstract
beliefs, however obnoxious to most people, may not be taken into consideration by a
sentencing judge.”) (citing Dawson v. Delaware, 503 U.S. 159 (1992)).
89
Id. at 484 (quoting Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 628 (1984)).
90
Id. at 488.
91
See Porter, supra note 49.
92
See City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 51-52 (1986). The Court
seems to closely analogize “special harms” to “secondary effects” that also serve as
justifications for the neutrality of content-based regulations. See id.

2018]

FIRST AMENDMENT & LEGISLATIVE REPRESSION

37

THE CREATION OF OFFENSES AND INCREASED PENALTIES
Perhaps the greatest threat to the right to dissent exists in the realm of
increased penalties for already extant offenses and the creation of new
ones.93 Including the overlapping Washington and North Carolina statutes
discussed above, at least eighteen states have proposed over thirty bills
either creating new offenses, increasing penalties, or both. The most
creatively punitive was Oregon’s S.B. 540, which would have required
public colleges and universities to expel any student convicted of riot, and
failed in committee.94 However, due to the continued relevance of public
streets and highways as sites of high profile discourse on matters of public
concern,95 state legislators have focused heavily on regulating
demonstrators in the streets, and specifically on those blocking traffic.96
Generally, state legislatures have wide latitude to codify criminal
offenses and set penalties. While challenges are certainly possible, many of
the still active or signed bills are very likely to be upheld, such as the ones
increasing penalties for existing obstruction laws. “Aggravated offenses”
with higher penalties for crimes against law enforcement or other public
officials are common and well within the power of the legislature, meaning
Georgia’s “Back the Badge Act of 2017” is likely constitutional.97 Of the
fourteen bills in this category that have already failed or been tabled or
withdrawn, many had strong chances of being upheld, such as increased
penalties for unlawful assembly, or making it a felony to tamper with oil
and gas equipment. The mass picketing bills, such as the North Dakota
bill98 creating the felony of direct or indirect economic harm and the South
Dakota bill99 requiring the elimination of “no-go zones,” were much more
suspect due to their potential overbreadth and high burdens on protected
activity.
93

See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-76 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring)
(“But they knew that order cannot be secured merely through fear of punishment for its
infraction; that it is hazardous to discourage thought, hope and imagination; that fear breeds
repression; that repression breeds hate; that hate menaces stable government; that the path
of safety lies in the opportunity to discuss freely supposed grievances and proposed
remedies; and that the fitting remedy for evil counsels is good ones.”).
94
S.B. 540, 79th Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2017).
95
See, e.g., Emily Badger, Why Highways Have Become the Center of Civil Rights
Protest, WASH. POST: WONKBLOG (July 13, 2016), https://perma.cc/BJS2-A7VT
(discussing the blocking of highways across the United States by racial justice advocates in
protest of recent police brutality, especially against Black youth).
96
Thirteen states have passed legislation that regulates demonstrators that block traffic.
See infra Appendix B.
97
S.B. 160, 2017 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2017).
98
H.B. 1193, 65th Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.D. 2017).
99
H.B. 1145, 2017 Legis. Assemb., 92nd Sess. (S.D. 2017).
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Several of the bills in the category of increased penalties and new
offenses appear especially susceptible to First Amendment challenges. One
example is Florida’s S.B. 1096, a restriction on political speech in a
traditional public forum, that would have made it a misdemeanor to
interfere with or impede the flow of traffic on any road or highway during
an unpermitted march or demonstration.100 The bill, which failed in
committee in May 2017, thus functionally prohibited all unpermitted
marches or demonstrations in the streets and facially implicated First
Amendment protected activity.101
South Dakota’s S.B. 176 (“the Act”), signed into law on March 13,
2017, is another one in the group that appears especially open to First
Amendment challenges.102 One avenue is an overbreadth and vagueness
challenge.103 Content-based arguments are also available. Most likely, the
bill will be analyzed as a content-neutral time, place, or manner restriction.
The first section of the Act is the most suspect, allowing the county
commissioner to deny use of public lands under their control if they, along
with the governor and sheriff, deem it necessary “to preserve the
undisturbed use of the land by the lessee or if the land may be damaged by
the activity.”104 A challenger could argue that this is a de facto permitting
scheme, based on undefined notions of a danger of damage to the land.105
South Dakota has not articulated specific factors for government officials to
consider when making such a decision. Instead, the law creates a sweeping
mechanism through which the governor, sheriffs, and county land
commissioners have nearly unbridled discretion to shut down all activity,
including First Amendment speech, by groups of more than twenty people
on public lands, a scheme the Court recognizes as ripe for unconstitutional
100

S.B. 1096, 2017 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2017).
See id.
102
S.B. 176, 2017 Leg. Assemb., 92nd Sess. (S.D. 2017).
103
See Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 129 (1992) (“[T]he
Court has permitted a party to [facially] challenge an ordinance under the overbreadth
doctrine in cases where every application creates an impermissible risk of suppression of
ideas, such as an ordinance that delegates overly broad discretion to the decisionmaker.”);
see also United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 304 (2008) (“Although ordinarily ‘[a]
plaintiff who engages in some conduct that is clearly proscribed cannot complain of the
vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct of others,’ we have relaxed that requirement
in the First Amendment context, permitting plaintiffs to argue that a statute is overbroad
because it is unclear whether it regulates a substantial amount of protected speech.”)
(quoting Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 495
(1982)).
104
S.B. 176, 2017 Leg. Assemb., 92nd Sess. (S.D. 2017).
105
See Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97 (1940) (“It is not merely the sporadic
abuse of power by the censor but the pervasive threat inherent in its very existence that
constitutes the danger to freedom of discussion.”).
101
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abuse.106 While such discretionary schemes and prior restraints are by no
means automatically void, there is a strong presumption of invalidity
against them.107 According to the Act itself, it is “necessary for the
immediate preservation of public peace, health, or safety,” and an
“emergency” exists by its declaration.108 Yet there is no actual emergency
cited or described by the bill—indeed there is none available for reference.
The law is in anticipation of protests that “need to be controlled,” as
Governor Dennis Daugaard’s Chief of Staff, Tony Venhuizen, explained to
the Associated Press.109 Even assuming the blanket significance of
government interests in protecting the use of the lessee or preventing public
land from damage, the section should not be found to be narrowly
tailored.110 The sections granting powers to the Secretary of Transportation
are attackable from similar angles. Finally, individual rules promulgated
under the Act may provide additional material for challenges in short order.
However, it is very plausible a court would decline to find that S.B. 176 is a
de facto licensing scheme. Under existing precedent, it might not be too far
of a reach to conclude that it is constitutional as either an incidental burden,
or a content-neutral, time, place, or manner restriction.
DRIVER LIABILITY BILLS
Besides Florida, four other states have considered bills relieving drivers
of liability for striking demonstrators: North Dakota,111 Tennessee,112
Texas,113 and North Carolina.114 These bills have received sharp public
outcry and all appear to be floundering, especially after anti-racist protester
Heather Heyer was killed by a neo-Nazi car attack in Charlottesville,
106

See id. at 97-98 (“[A] statute, which readily lends itself to harsh and discriminatory
enforcement by local prosecuting officials, against particular groups deemed to merit their
displeasure, results in a continuous and pervasive restraint on all freedom of discussion that
might reasonably be regarded as within its purview.”).
107
See Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963) (“Any system of prior
restraints of expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its
constitutional validity.”).
108
S.D. S.B. 176.
109
North Dakota Pipeline Protest Spurs South Dakota Legislation, CBS MINN. (Feb.
15, 2017, 8:03 PM), https://perma.cc/97HY-VFA9.
110
See Burk v. Augusta-Richmond County, 365 F.3d 1247, 1256 (2004) (“Excessive
discretion over permitting decisions is constitutionally suspect because it creates the
opportunity for undetectable censorship and signals a lack of narrow tailoring.”).
111
H.B. 1203, 65th Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.D. 2017).
112
H.B. 668, 110th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2017); S.B. 944, 110th General
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2017).
113
H.B. 3432, 85th Leg. Sess., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2017).
114
H.B. 330, 2017 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2017).
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Virginia, on August 12, 2017.115
North Carolina’s H.B. 330, the only bill that appears to have a chance of
becoming law after passing the North Carolina House, is susceptible to a
strong challenge as a content-neutral regulation that “incidentally” burdens
protected speech. The bill should fail even the Rumsfeld / Albertini iteration
of the O’Brien test because it cannot be said that the “regulation promotes a
substantial government interest that would be achieved less effectively
absent the regulation.”116 This is because North Carolina adheres to a pure
contributory negligence rule. If the injured party is found to be responsible
for any fault in a negligence action, the defendant will not be liable for
damages. Thus, the bill does nothing to advance any assumedly legitimate
government interest in protecting drivers who exercise due care from civil
liability. Because the bill does not impact the current operation of North
Carolina law, but burdens protected speech in a severe manner, an inference
should arise that the bill is at its core related to the suppression of free
expression. For failure on both these prongs, it should be found
unconstitutional.
ANTI-MASKING STATUTES
Missouri and North Dakota are the two most recent states adding or
considering criminal penalties for wearing a mask. Missouri’s H.B. 179, in
committee, makes it a class A misdemeanor to conceal one’s identity during
an unlawful assembly or riot “by the means of a robe, mask, or other
disguise.”117 North Dakota’s Governor signed H.B. 1304 into law on March
2, 2017.118 It outlaws the wearing of a “mask, hood, or other device that
covers, hides, or conceals any portion of that individual’s face:
a. With the intent to intimidate, threaten,
abuse, or harass any other individual;
b. For the purpose of evading or escaping
discovery, recognition, or identification
during the commission of a criminal offense;
115

Lauren McGaughy, Texas Lawmaker: Bill to Protect Drivers Who Hit Protesters
Would Not Apply to ‘Jackass’ Charged in Charlottesville Murder, DALLAS NEWS (Aug. 14,
2017), https://perma.cc/6YHQ-F7SC.
116
See Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 67
(2006) (“We have held that ‘an incidental burden on speech is no greater than is essential,
and therefore is permissible under O'Brien, so long as the neutral regulation promotes a
substantial government interest that would be achieved less effectively absent the
regulation.’”) (citing United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 689 (1985)).
117
H.B. 179, 99th General Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2017).
118
H.B. 1304, 65th Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.D. 2017).
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or
c. For the purpose of concealment, flight, or
escape when the individual has been charged
with, arrested for, or convicted of a criminal
offense.”119
Its main sponsor, Republican Representative Al Carlson, maintained the bill
was concerned with safety, stating, “I would be the first to defend your right
of free speech . . . I’m always concerned when there’s a reason that . . . may
be used to hide your identity when you’re creating some kind of
disturbance.” He cited examples of people fighting the Dakota Access
Pipeline by “cutting razor wire and burning tires,”120 and maintained no
protest with masked people could be peaceful: “That’s not a peaceful
protest . . . . It might be legal in Baghdad but not in Bismarck.”121
Anti-masking statutes have existed in many states for decades and are
also known as “KKK laws,” referencing the Ku Klux Klan (“KKK”). In
1951, Georgia made it illegal to wear a mask on public property, or while
on private property without permission. The statute was upheld against a
First Amendment challenge by the Georgia Supreme Court in 1990.122
Applying the O’Brien framework regarding regulation of mixed speech and
non-speech elements, the court found that the law was passed to protect
Georgia’s citizens from violence and terror at the hands of the Klan, restore
confidence in law enforcement, and safeguard civil rights—these interests
were not only substantial but compelling and the constitutional duty of the
state.123 It found the law was content-neutral, proscribing “menacing
conduct without regard to the particular message of the mask-wearer.”124
However, the statute outlaws, without any further qualifications, wearing a
mask on public property or private property without permission.125 It does
not require an intent to intimidate, harass, or threaten. This means the court
must conclude that wearing a mask outside one of the named exemptions is
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N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-31-15 (2017).
John Hageman, Constitutionality of Mask Bill Debated in North Dakota
Legislature, WEST FARGO PIONEER (Jan. 24, 2017, 4:53 PM), https://perma.cc/BGD22T6C.
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Nick Smith, Bill Would Ban Protesters from Using Face Masks, BISMARCK
TRIBUNE (Jan. 17, 2017), https://perma.cc/HS69-L8FW.
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State v. Miller, 260 Ga. 669 (1990).
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Id. at 672-73.
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Id. at 673.
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See GA. CODE ANN., § 16-11-38 (West 2017). The statute includes exemptions for
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inherently menacing.126
Such a sweeping assumption is faulty ground from which to build strong
legal analysis and could be disproven by a challenger that does not belong
to the KKK but wears a mask as expressive conduct.127 Further, under
North Dakota’s statute, demonstrators committing no independent crime,
but who are wearing a bandanna at a march on the sidewalk, could be
arrested under the anti-masking statute as acting with intent to intimidate
law enforcement under subsection (a). The law gives prosecutors an
additional charge that increases a potential sentence used as leverage to
make defendants plead out or cooperate. These facts point to a strong
chilling effect that can be leveraged against the law in overbreadth and void
for vagueness challenges.
In New York, anti-masking legislation has been on the books since land
revolts prior to the Civil War during which tenant farmers would wear
masks in their appropriation and defense of land from the owners of “vast
manorial estates.”128 Well over a century later, KKK members attempting to
hold a rally in full regalia brought a facial challenge to the present version
of that legislation, New York Penal Law §240.35(4), after they were
informed by the NYPD in response to their permit application that their
plans to wear masks would violate the criminal code.129 The District Court
found that the wearing of masks was protected by the right to anonymous
speech, grounded in NAACP v. Alabama, and thus the regulation had to face
strict scrutiny, which it failed.130 The Court also applied O’Brien analysis
and found the statute was not narrowly tailored to a significant or
substantial government interest because the statute was not tied to criminal
conduct by the wearer.131 It also found the statute facially invalid as a
content-based regulation that applied to political speech but not masks for
entertainment.132 Finally, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
New York concluded that New York City engaged in viewpoint
discrimination by applying the statute to the Klan but not similarly situated
126

See Miller, 260 Ga. at 671-72 (“A nameless, faceless figure strikes terror in the
human heart. But, remove the mask, and the nightmarish form is reduced to its true
dimensions.”).
127
See Monika Nickelsburg, A Brief History of the Guy Fawkes Mask, MENTAL FLOSS
(Nov. 5, 2015), https://perma.cc/7BQE-CJGN (providing a brief history of the symbolism
of the Guy Fawkes mask, including their widespread use at Occupy protests as a symbol of
anti-authoritarianism and of everyday people resisting a tyrannical government).
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See Church of the Am. Knights of the KKK v. Kerik, 356 F.3d 197, 203-05 (2d Cir.
2004) (overviewing a brief history of anti-masking legislation).
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Church of the Am. Knights of the KKK v. Kerik, 232 F. Supp. 2d 205 (S.D.N.Y.
2002), rev’d and remanded, 356 F.3d 197 (2d Cir. 2004).
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Id. at 213-15.
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Id. at 217.
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Id. at 218-19.
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groups.133
The Second Circuit reversed, finding that while the regalia of the
KKK—the robe, mask, and hood—were indeed expressive conduct that
qualified for protection, the mask itself was optional for group members and
therefore not an integral part of the expression.134 Rather, it was
“redundant,” and had no independent message, and “where . . . a statute
banning conduct imposes a burden on the wearing of an element of an
expressive uniform, which element has no independent or incremental
expressive value, the First Amendment is not implicated.”135 Thus, an
O’Brien analysis was unnecessary.
Future challengers to anti-masking statutes, perhaps Occupiers wearing
Guy Fawkes masks, might be able to effectively distinguish Kerik, because
the analysis is tied so closely to the specific expressiveness of the entire
KKK uniform.136 This would open the door to the various arguments the
District Court made against the validity of the statute vis-à-vis the First
Amendment. However, in Kerik, because the Knights’ wearing of the masks
(alone) was not expressive conduct, and the statute only concerned itself
with wearing masks in groups “rather than pure speech,” it was not invalid
as a content-based regulation because no First Amendment protected
activity was implicated.137 For the same reasons, there could be no basis to
find viewpoint discrimination.138 Finally, the Second Circuit also rejected
the District Court’s finding that the statute was invalid under the right to
anonymous speech.139 Noting that neither the Supreme Court, nor any
Circuit Court, had ever extended the protections against compelled
disclosure of names in various other circumstances to one’s identity at a
protest, the Court found the right to anonymous speech was not
implicated.140
Under these precedents, challengers to new or old anti-masking statutes
face an uphill climb. However, there is solid ground on which to distinguish
the expressive nature of anti-capitalist protesters identifiable solely and
immediately by their Guy Fawkes masks from Klansmen in full hooded
regalia, at least in as-applied challenges. A key could be proving the mask
133
134
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itself is speech under the requirements of the Spence test—the mask’s
message is particular, with a great likelihood it will be understood by
viewers. If this can be accomplished, Miller, where the mask is inherently a
symbol of malicious intent, and Kerik, where the mask is redundant, are
much less potent hurdles. The exceptions in the laws also allow for
arguments that they are facially content-based regulations focused on
political speech only and should fail under strict scrutiny, an argument with
increased potency in light of Reed v. Town of Gilbert, Arizona.
CONCLUSION
Nick Zerwas made an unmistakable reference when he remarked on the
cost that Black demonstrators exercising their First Amendment rights must
pay to secure the guarantees of the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth
Amendment rights, among others. States have historically imposed a
repressive toll—surveillance, infiltration, jail time, and blood—on political
organizing and activity, especially by systemically oppressed groups. The
First Amendment, for most of United States history, offered very little
protection for people who fought for greater autonomy and equality by
openly organizing and taking to the streets. Over the last hundred years, the
Supreme Court, recognizing the utility of a vent in releasing increased
pressure, has imbued the First Amendment, and other fundamental rights,
with more robust safeguards against government infringement as the power
of states and the federal government has increased exponentially. In recent
decades, however, the growth of state police power has eclipsed the
trajectory of the First Amendment as a guard of the right to dissent.
A cursory analysis of a sample of the proposed legislation and how it
has fared in the process shows the First Amendment is not the strongest tool
those hoping to redirect trajectories of power, and win more control over
their bodies, lives, and communities, possess to protect themselves from
legislative repression. Early intervention has already proven far more
effective—and efficient—than constitutional challenges will likely be. Bills
increasing penalties for obstruction related offenses, trespassing, and so
forth are unlikely to fail constitutional muster. While some of the harshest
bills are much more suspect, activists are already facing decades in prison
for engaging in protected activities and civil disobedience. The First
Amendment in its modern form has not stopped the authoritarian creep of
the last several decades, and cannot be expected to stem the latest wave of
repression.
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Appendix A — Legislation by State141
Arizona
S.B. 1142 (died in House Rules committee after
passing Senate)
Arkansas
S.B. 550 (vetoed by Governor)
H.B. 1756 (sent to Governor 4/03/17)
Colorado
S.B. 35 (passed Senate and failed in House
Committee on State, Veterans, & Military Affairs)
Florida
S.B. 1096 (died in Criminal Justice Committee)
Georgia
S.B. 1 (passed Senate & failed on House vote)
S.B. 160 (signed by Governor sans traffic related
provisions on 05/08/17)
Indiana
S.B. 285 (passed Senate & referred to House
Committee on Rules & Legislative Procedures)
Iowa
S.F. 111 (introduced in Transportation
Committee)
Michigan
H.B. 4643 (passed House & tabled in Senate)
H.B. 4630 (passed House & tabled in Senate)
Minnesota
H.F. 34 (introduced in Public Safety & Security
Policy & Finance Committee)
S.F. 148 (in Committee)
S.F. 184 (introduced in Judiciary & Public Safety
Finance and Policy Committee)
H.F. 55 (introduced in Transportation & Regional
Governance & Policy Committee)
H.F. 322 (introduced in Public Safety & Security
Policy & Finance Committee)
H.F. 390 (introduced in Public Safety & Security
Policy & Finance Committee)
S.F. 676 (introduced in Judiciary & Public Safety
Finance & Policy Committees)
S.F. 679 (introduced in Judiciary & Public Safety
Finance & Policy Committee)

141

Information current as of December 2017.

S.F. 918 (introduced in Judiciary & Public Safety
& Finance & Policy Committee)
H.F. 1066 (introduced in Public Safety & Security
Policy & Finance Committees)
Mississippi
S.B. 2730 (died in Judiciary Committee)
Missouri
H.B. 179 (died in Local, State, Federal Relations
and Miscellaneous Business Committee)
H.B. 826 (died in Crime Prevention & Public
Safety Committee)
New York
S.B. 2492 (Passed Senate & referred to Assembly
Governmental Operations Committee on
03/08/17)
S.B. 2493 (Passed Senate; in Assembly
Committee)
S.B. 4837 (Passed Senate; in Assembly
Committee)
North Carolina
H.B. 249 (in Committee)
H.B. 330
North Dakota
H.B. 1193 (Passed House; Failed in Senate)
H.B. 1203 (Failed in House)
H.B. 1293 (Effective 3/02/17)
H.B. 1304 (Effective 3/02/17)
H.B. 1426 (Effective 3/02/17)
S.B. 2302 (Effective 3/01/17)
Oklahoma
H.B. 1123 (signed by Governor on 05/03/17)
H.B. 2128 (signed by Governor on 5/15/17)
Oregon
S.B. 540 (died in Education & Judiciary
Committees)
Pennsylvania
S.B. 754 (introduced in State Government
Committee)
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South Dakota
S.B. 176 (signed by Governor on 03/27/17)
H.B. 1145 (withdrawn from Judiciary Committee)
Tennessee
H.B. 668 (died in House Civil Justice Committee)
S.B. 902 (signed by Governor on 04/12/17)
S.B. 944 (introduced in Judiciary Committee)
H.B. 1051 (signed by Governor on 04/12/17)
Texas
H.B. 250 (pending in Judiciary & Civil
Jurisprudence Committee)
Virginia
S.B. 1055 (failed on Senate vote)
S.B. 1056 (died in Committee for Courts of
Justice)
S.B. 1057 (died in Committee for Courts of
Justice)
S.B. 1058 (failed on Senate vote)
H.B. 1791 (vetoed by Governor)
Washington
S.B. 5009 (introduced in Law & Justice
Committee)
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Appendix B — Legislation by Category142
Anti-BDS Legislation
New York S.B. 2492 (passed Senate & referred to
Assembly Governmental Operations Committee)
New York S.B. 2493 (passed Senate & referred to
Assembly Higher Education Committee)
New York S.B. 4837 (passed Senate & referred to
Assembly Higher Education Committee)
Anti-Masking Offense
Missouri H.B. 179 (new misdemeanor) (died in
Local, State, Federal Relations and Miscellaneous
Business Committee)
North Dakota H.B. 1304 (new misdemeanor)
(signed by Governor on 02/23/17)
Citizen or Organization Liability
Arizona S.B. 1142 (died in House Rules
committee after passing Senate)
Minnesota H.F. 322 / S.F. 679 (introduced in
House Public Safety & Security Policy & Finance
Committee & Senate Judiciary & Public Safety
Finance & Policy Committee)
Oklahoma H.B. 1123 (signed by Governor on
05/03/17)
Oklahoma S.B. 2128 (signed by Governor on
05/03/17)
Pennsylvania S.B. 754 (introduced in State
Government Committee)
Driver Immunity Statutes
Florida S.B. 1096 (died in Criminal Justice
Committee)
North Carolina H.B. 330 (passed House &
referred to Senate Committee on 04/27/17)
North Dakota H.B. 1203 (failed on vote)
Tennessee H.B. 668 / S.B. 944 (died in House
Civil Justice Committee & introduced in Senate
Judiciary Committee)
Texas H.B. 250 (pending in Judiciary & Civil
Jurisprudence Committee)
“Economic Terrorism” (ET), Trespass &
Interfering with Industry Related Offenses
Colorado S.B. 35 (upgraded existing
misdemeanor to felony) (Passed Senate and failed
in House Committee on State, Veterans, &
Military Affairs)

142

Georgia S.B. 1 (expanded existing felonies)
(passed Senate & failed on House vote)
North Carolina H.B. 249 (failed in Committee
on Rules, Calendar, and Operations; re-introduced
in Judiciary Committee)
North Dakota 1193 (new felony) (failed on
Senate vote after passing House)
Oklahoma H.B. 1123 (new felonies and
misdemeanor) (signed by Governor on 05/03/17)
South Dakota S.B. 176 (new misdemeanors)
(signed by Governor on 03/27/17)
Washington S.B. 5009 (new felony) (introduced
in Law & Justice Committee)
Unlawful Assembly & Riot Related Offenses
Arizona S.B. 1142 (new felonies) (died in House
Rules committee after passing Senate)
Minnesota H.F. 34 / S.F. 184 (expanded felony)
(introduced in House Public Safety and Security
Policy & Finance Committee & Senate Judiciary
& Public Safety Finance & Policy Committee)
Missouri H.B. 826 (new misdemeanor and
felony) (died in Crime Prevention & Public Safety
Committee)
North Dakota H.B. 1426 (upgraded
misdemeanor and felonies) (signed by Governor
on 02/23/17)
Oregon S.B. 540 (increased penalty for existing
offense) (died in Education & Judiciary
Committees)
South Dakota H.B. 1145 (withdrawn from
Judiciary Committee)
Virginia S.B. 1055 (upgraded misdemeanor)
(failed on Senate vote)
Virginia S.B. 1056 (upgraded misdemeanor)
(died in Committee for Courts of Justice)
Virginia S.B. 1057 (upgraded felony) (died in
Committee for Courts of Justice)
Virginia S.B. 1058 (new felony) (failed on Senate
vote)
Virginia H.B. 1791 (new felonies) (vetoed by
Governor)
Traffic & Roadway Related Offenses
Arkansas S.B. 550 (new misdemeanor) (vetoed
by Governor)
Arkansas H.B. 1756 (expanded misdemeanor)
(sent to Governor 4/03/17)

Information current as of December 2017. Legislation that fits multiple categories appears in duplicate.

48

CUNY LAW REVIEW FOOTNOTE FORUM

Florida S.B. 1096 (new misdemeanor) (died in
Criminal Justice Committee)
Georgia S.B. 160 (mandatory minimums for
existing offenses) (signed by Governor sans traffic
related provisions on 05/08/17)
Indiana S.B. 285 (new violation) (passed Senate
& referred to House Committee on Rules &
Legislative Procedures)
Iowa S.F. 111 (new felony) (introduced in
Judiciary Committee)
Minnesota S.F. 148 / H.F. 55 (new
misdemeanor) (introduced in Senate Judiciary &
Public Safety & Finance & Policy Committee &
Senate Transportation & Regional Governance &
Policy Committee)
Minnesota H.B. 390 / S.F. 676 (upgraded
misdemeanors) (introduced in House Public
Safety & Security Policy & Finance Committee &
Senate Judiciary & Public Safety & Finance &
Policy Committees)
Minnesota S.F. 918 / H.F. 1066 (new
misdemeanor) (in Committee) (introduced in
Senate Judiciary & Public Safety & Finance &
Policy Committee & House Public Safety &
Security Policy & Finance Committee)
Mississippi S.B. 2730 (new felony) (died in
Judiciary Committee)
Missouri H.B. 826 (new felony and
misdemeanors) (died in Crime Prevention &
Public Safety Committee)
North Carolina H.B. 249 (upgraded
misdemeanor) (failed in Committee on Rules,
Calendar, and Operations; re-introduced in
Judiciary Committee)
South Dakota S.B. 176 (new misdemeanors)
(signed by Governor on 03/27/17)
Tennessee S.B. 902 / 1051 (upgraded
misdemeanor) (signed by Governor on 04/12/17)
Virginia S.B. 1058 (new felony) (died in
Committee for Courts of Justice)
Mass Picketing and Strike Related Offenses and
Laws
Arkansas S.B. 550 (new misdemeanors) (vetoed
by Governor)
Mass Picketing and Strike Related Offenses
and Laws
Arkansas S.B. 550 (new misdemeanors) (vetoed
by Governor)
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Michigan H.B. 4630 (increasing fines for existing
misdemeanors) (passed House & tabled in Senate)
Michigan H.B. 4643 (passed House & tabled in
Senate)

